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CONFLICTING REPORTS: WHEN GUN
RIGHTS THREATEN FREE SPEECH
GREGORY P. MAGARIAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of a judicially cognizable Second Amendment right of individuals to keep and bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller1 and McDonald
v. Chicago2 has opened a new arena for collisions between constitutional interests. Gun rights advocates frequently argue that guns complement or even promote the expressive freedom protected by the First Amendment, mainly through
the insurrectionist logic that the people need arms in order to resist the kind of
tyrannical government that would suppress speech.3 In the real world, however,
guns far more commonly impede and chill free speech than protect or promote
it. The Supreme Court’s declaration that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home”4 heightens the urgency of assessing collisions between interests grounded in the First and Second Amendments.
This Article catalogs and analyzes collisions between free speech and gun
rights. The most important and hotly debated of those collisions is the clash between the First Amendment rights to assemble and speak in public political protests and the asserted Second Amendment right to carry firearms openly in public
places. Beyond protests, public university students’ First Amendment rights to
speak and learn clash with the asserted Second Amendment right to carry concealed weapons on university campuses; First Amendment interests in robust political deliberation clash with Second Amendment interests in promoting and securing the right to keep and bear arms; and First Amendment interests in
disclosures of information clash with privacy interests grounded in the Second
Amendment. In addition, debates about how to address rampant gun violence
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1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
3. For a thorough treatment of the anti-tyranny argument for the Second Amendment, see DAVID
C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE
IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003).
4. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added).
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have led Second Amendment advocates to urge restricting the expressive content
of entertainment media as a way of avoiding gun regulations.
Collisions of First and Second Amendment interests need not present legally
cognizable collisions of First and Second Amendment rights. Courts have been
actively engaging with First Amendment claims for a century. While First
Amendment law still presents deep and profound controversies, we have a fairly
solid legal understanding of what the First Amendment protects. The Second
Amendment, in contrast, has attracted serious judicial attention for just over a
decade. We have only a nascent, hazy sense of what sorts of regulations the Court
might strike down as violating the Second Amendment. Whether or not judicially
cognizable First and Second Amendment rights collide, we should care about the
ways in which gun rights interests undermine free speech interests. Our opportunities to speak, to assemble, to protest, to learn, and to advocate form the spine
of our democratic culture.
Part II of this Article catalogs types of First and Second Amendment collisions and considers how present legal doctrine might lead courts or legislatures
to assess and resolve those collisions. The frequency and variety of collisions between First and Second Amendment interests show that these superficially similar constitutional protections actually promote sharply divergent, often incompatible values. Part III steps back from the details to consider broad normative
tensions in speech-arms collisions: tensions between individual autonomy and
communal engagement and between political and social stability and dynamism.
II
COLLISIONS BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND AMENDMENT INTERESTS
Free speech and gun rights might appear capable of harmonious coexistence.
Both promote liberty. Free speech theory entails a sharp distinction between
speech and action, and the keeping and bearing of arms is action. Thus, speech
and guns occupy different lanes that we might think would not cross. However,
the dozen years since the Supreme Court recognized an individual right to keep
and bear arms have brought multiple collisions between free speech and gun
rights. Taken together, these collisions reveal a deep tension between First and
Second Amendment interests.
A. Public Carry vs. Public Discourse
1. The Charlottesville Problem: Open Carry vs. Public Protest
On August 11 and 12, 2017, Charlottesville, Virginia played reluctant host to
the deadly “Unite the Right” rally.5 The rally brought conservative activists from

5. This account draws on an independent review that the Virginia law firm Hunton & Williams
performed for the City of Charlottesville after the “Unite the Right” rally. See HUNTON & WILLIAMS,
FINAL REPORT: INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 2017 PROTEST EVENTS IN CHARLOTTESVILLE,
VIRGINIA 4–7 (Nov. 24, 2017).
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around the country, including Nazis and other white supremacists, to protest
Charlottesville’s decision to remove a prominent statue of Confederate general
Robert E. Lee from a public park.6 News of the rally inspired a forceful left-wing
counter-protest.7 Numerous violent incidents unfolded over the two-day event,
culminating in the murder of counter-protester Heather Heyer when an Ohio
conservative activist plowed his car into a crowd.8
Virginia allows the open carrying of firearms without any permit and imposes
few restrictions on assault weapons.9 Numerous participants in the Unite the
Right rally, both right-wing protesters and militia members who claimed to want
to help keep the peace, openly displayed rifles and handguns during the weekend’s tense and often violent events.10 An independent review commissioned by
the City of Charlottesville strongly criticized the Virginia State Police and the
Charlottesville police department for deficient planning and preparation and for
abjectly failing to protect public safety during clashes between right-wing activists
and counter-protestors.11 After the rally, Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe defended police inaction, stating: “You saw the militia walking down the street, you
would have thought they were an army[.] . . . [They] had better equipment than
our State Police had[.] It’s easy to criticize, but I can tell you this, 80% of the
people here had semiautomatic weapons.”12
The First Amendment interest in public protest and the Second Amendment
interest in openly carrying firearms have collided in numerous other settings.13
Thirty-six states permit guns at public protests, and nine others presumptively
allow guns at protests while leaving municipalities some discretion.14 Armed militia members at the Charlottesville rally claimed that they displayed weapons to
protect all parties’ ability to speak without fear of violent retribution.15 That claim

6. See id. at 1, 4 (noting that neo-Nazi Jason Kessler opposed Charlottesville’s efforts to remove
the Robert E. Lee statue and organized the August 11 and 12 protests).
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 4–7.
9. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-287.4 (2016).
10. HUNTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 70, 123.
11. See id. at 153–66.
12. Harrison Jacobs, VA Governor Defends Charlottesville Response: Militia Members Had “Better”
Guns Than Police, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/virginia-gov-mcauliffe-defends-charlottesville-police-better-semiautomatic-guns-white-nationalists-2017-8
[https://perma.cc/6L54-3B5S].
13. Accounts of prominent armed protests prior to Charlottesville appear in Katlyn E. DeBoer,
Clash of the First and Second Amendments: Proposed Regulation of Armed Protests, 45 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 333, 337 (2018), and Daniel Horwitz, Note, Open-Carry: Open-Conversation or OpenThreat?, 15 FIRST AM. L. REV. 96, at 105–06 (2017).
14. Alex Yablon, The 36 States Where Local Officials Can’t Ban Guns at Protests, TRACE (Sep. 11,
2017), https://www.thetrace.org/2017/09/35-states-local-officials-cant-ban-guns-protests
[https://perma.cc/C2QJ-H5UZ].
15. See Paul Duggan, Militiamen Came to Charlottesville as Neutral First Amendment Protectors,
Commander Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficand/
commuting/militiamen-came-to-charlottesville-as-neutral-first-amendment-protectors-commandersays/2017/08/13/d3928794-8055-11e7-ab27-1a21a8e006ab_story.html [https://perma.cc/52E2-PCEK].

BOOK PROOF - MAGARIAN (DO NOT DELETE)

172

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

8/4/2020 10:52 PM

[Vol. 83:169

tracks gun rights advocates’ argument that minority factions can effectively use
open carry to protect themselves against hostile majorities.16 Critics respond that
right-wing activists’ and militia members’ display of firearms in Charlottesville
chilled left-wing counter-protesters’ speech and, more broadly, that public display of firearms inevitably chills the speech of unarmed people who would like
to challenge the arms-bearers’ political message.17 Even if some armed protestors
have benign intentions, unarmed protesters and law enforcement have no way to
distinguish those self-appointed watchmen from bad actors who wield guns to
intimidate opponents.18 Based on this concern about chilling speech, the American Civil Liberties Union announced after Charlottesville that it would no longer
defend the right to bear arms in public protests.19
Both sides in the debate over armed protests might present speech interests.
The open carrying of a firearm arguably serves, at least in some contexts, not just
the Second Amendment interest in self-defense but also the First Amendment
interest in expressing an idea. Commentators differ about whether open carry
has meaningful expressive content.20 In most contexts, open carry is action, not
speech. Every action has some expressive content—when I walk down the street,
I convey the message that I’m walking down the street—but First Amendment
law depends on a speech-conduct distinction that excludes most instances of open
carry from First Amendment protection.21 To the extent open carry conveys a
message of intimidation, that message would constitute a “true threat” ineligible
for First Amendment protection.22 The strongest case for a First Amendment interest in open carry arises when gun rights activists display their weapons in political demonstrations in support of open carry itself.23 Even in that setting, however, many government restrictions could presumably satisfy the First

16. See Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 102
(2009).
17. See David Frum, The Chilling Effects of Openly Displayed Firearms, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/open-carry-laws-mean-charlottesville-could-havebeen-graver/537087 [https://perma.cc/WWJ6-RVL3].
18. Eugene Volokh, however, has insisted that “the legal system has had, and should have, little
difficulty distinguishing individual citizens’ permissible legal possession for self-defense from mob action
aimed at attacking or terrorizing.” Volokh, supra note 16, at 103.
19. See Joe Palazzolo, ACLU Will No Longer Defend Hate Groups Protesting With Firearms, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aclu-changes-policy-on-defending-hate-groupsprotesting-with-firearms-1503010167 [https://perma.cc/8GEB-7G3C].
20. Compare David M. Shapiro, Guns, Speech, Charlottesville: The Semiotics of Semiautomatics, 106
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2017) (“Because of their semiotic content, the firearms displayed in Charlottesville . . . constitute speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”), with DeBoer, supra note
13, at 341–48 (contending that the open display of firearms generally lacks expressive content).
21. See Gregory P. Magarian, Political and Nonpolitical Speech and Guns, 28 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 429, 441–43 (2020) (explaining and analyzing the First Amendment speech-conduct distinction).
22. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (explaining the “true threats” exemption from
First Amendment protection).
23. See TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 220 (2018); DeBoer, supra note 13, at 346–47.
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Amendment’s allowance for content-neutral regulations of expressive conduct.24
Courts generally have rejected claims that open carry expresses a coherent message, finding that carrying a firearm is conduct outside the First Amendment’s
protection.25 I proceed on the premise that any constitutional grounding for the
interest in openly carrying a gun at a political protest lies in the Second Amendment. The question is whether, and to what extent, First Amendment concerns
about the chilling of speech can justify legal restrictions on open carry.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald do not settle whether
the Second Amendment protects open carry, although Heller validates the historical pedigree of concealed carry bans.26 Gun rights advocates promote open
carry through a familiar libertarian argument: We should get to carry guns for
self-defense wherever we go.27 They sometimes also advance a communitarian
argument: The presence, and proliferation, of guns will keep public spaces safe
as “good guys with guns” protect everyone’s capacity to speak freely.28 That argument, however, has little theoretical or empirical foundation. On the First
Amendment side, the argument that open carry chills speech starts out as an individual autonomy argument about the right to speak without fear. The free
speech argument has a broader societal corollary: Open carry, by chilling speech,
deprives the public of valuable information from the chilled speakers.29 Thus, the
problem of open carry and public protest mainly pits a gun rights autonomy argument against a communal free speech argument. We will see this pattern recur
in other speech-arms collisions.
The argument that guns chill speech at public protests presents two potential
difficulties. First, the extent to which open carry intimidates speakers is an empirical question for which we lack data.30 However, First Amendment law has
24. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (articulating the First Amendment
test for regulations of expressive conduct).
25. See Kendall Burchard, Note, Your ‘Little Friend’ Doesn’t Say ‘Hello’: Putting the First Amendment Before the Second in Public Protests, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 30, 33–34 (2018) (compiling court
decisions about the expressive content of carrying firearms). The Second Circuit used similar reasoning
to reject an argument that a municipal ban on transporting a firearm outside the city violated gun owners’
First Amendment right of expressive association by limiting their capacity to join gun clubs outside the
city. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated
as moot, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (per curiam).
26. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (discussing historical cases and commentators’ views on the right to concealed carry).
27. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1515 (2009) (“[S]elf-defense has
to take place wherever the person happens to be. Nearly any prohibition on having arms for self-defense
in a particular place . . . is a substantial burden on the right to bear arms for self-defense.”).
28. Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller call this the “marketplace of violence” argument for gun
rights. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 155 (2018).
29. “[T]he presence of a gun in public,” writes Darrell Miller, “has the effect of chilling or distorting
the essential channels of a democracy—public deliberation and interchange.” Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns
as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1309–10 (2009)
(footnote omitted).
30. ZICK, supra note 23, at 218–19.
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long taken arguments about the chilling of speech seriously without data.31 Moreover, the Charlottesville story highlights one concrete way that open carry chills
speech: the intimidation of police. Police protection is a crucial (if often underappreciated) aspect of a meaningful right to expressive freedom.32 Police presence
at a contentious public protest can cool the threat of violence between and among
factions, while police withdrawal puts the threat of private violence back in play,
as Charlottesville illustrates.33 Thus, even without empirical data, the argument
that open carry chills speech deserves to be taken seriously. Second, any chill
from open carry comes from private actors whose actions cannot form the basis
for constitutional complaints.34 However, the Court has invoked the First
Amendment to limit government actions that enable private chilling.35 Indeed, a
finding that enactment of an open carry law encouraged private chilling of speech
might form a basis for a constitutional claim.36 In any event, the First Amendment
interest in unencumbered public protest need not support an independent constitutional claim; it need only overcome Second Amendment objections to government regulation of guns at public protests.
How should we resolve the collision of speech and arms in public protests?
The simplest solution would be a broad legal ban on open carry. A more targeted
approach would zone open carry by banning guns specifically at public protests.37
Such a ban would situate protests among the “sensitive places” where Heller permits restrictions on Second Amendment rights.38 A narrower variation on zoning
would give law enforcement discretion to contain armed protesters in specified
zones within or adjacent to protests.39 These targeted approaches have First

31. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (presuming without data that a federal ban on virtual child pornography chilled protected speech); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972)
(accepting without data that an Army program to infiltrate public meetings chilled political dissent).
32. See, e.g., Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (striking down on First
Amendment grounds a local ordinance that let the city charge public demonstrators variable fees for law
enforcement protection).
33. See Dahlia Lithwick & Mark J. Stern, The Guns Won, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/08/the-first-and-second-amendments-clashed-in-charlottesvillethe-guns-won.html [https://perma.cc/5227-EM2S] (explaining how the lack of police presence led to violence in Charlottesville).
34. ZICK, supra note 23, at 223 (explaining that any “alleged injury relates most directly to private
decisions to openly carry firearms at public protests, and not to any unlawful act of government”).
35. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 99 (1982) (citing instances of private harassment and intimidation to justify a First Amendment bar on government collection and disclosure of information about campaign contributions to a controversial political party).
36. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378–79 (1967) (letting private actions support a Fourteenth
Amendment claim after the state had amended its constitution to block municipalities from banning
housing discrimination, explaining that the amendment “would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an unconstitutional degree”).
37. See DeBoer, supra note 13, at 341.
38. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
39. See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 4–6 (explaining the concept, benefits, and downsides of open-carry
zones).
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Amendment parallels in arguments for according certain speech-promoting institutions special First Amendment status40 and for allowing certain restrictions
on speech in distinctive settings like elections.41 However, engineering a special
legal basis for regulating protests would create an unacceptable risk that governments might restrict not just guns at protests but also speech itself. The idea of a
“protest” does not define a legal category, and protests are not subject to substantial government management. Rather, protests are a fluid, contestable, radically democratic phenomenon. The Supreme Court in recent years has shown
public protesters scant concern and occasional disdain.42 Meanwhile, the federal
government and most states have recently enacted or considered various
measures to strangle public protests.43 Well-intended efforts to thread the speecharms needle by specifically disarming protests might cause the unintended harm
of legitimating schemes to suppress protests.
To avoid the First Amendment problems with singling out protests for special
legal treatment, a zoning approach would need to be general rather than limited
to protests. Law enforcement would need discretion to zone open carry based on
public safety concerns in any setting, without regard to the content of the underlying speech or assembly. Like targeted protest zoning, generalized zoning of
open carry would parallel the sort of “time, place, and manner” regulation that
the First Amendment permits for speech on public property.44 If the Supreme
Court were to announce Second Amendment protection for public carry, open
carry zoning would require a judicial backstop to ensure that particular instances
of zoning did not violate gun rights. The generalized zoning approach would not
be perfect from a free speech standpoint, because unarmed protesters’ freedom
from armed intimidation would depend on law enforcement’s discretion. Even
so, a generalized zoning approach would substantially ameliorate public guns’
chilling effect on public speech.
2. State Universities: Concealed Carry vs. Public Education
Pro-gun state legislatures are increasingly using their powers over state universities to extend concealed-carry mandates to university campuses, including

40. See generally Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1256 (2005) (discussing which institutions’ speech should be protected in which ways).
41. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999) (evaluating the possibility of election-specific First Amendment principles).
42. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 489 (2014) (distinguishing anti-abortion “counselors”
from the less favored category of “protestors”).
43. For a catalog of anti-protest legislation introduced in the United States since November 2016,
including penalty enhancements for protests near energy pipelines, broadening of trespass offenses to
sweep in protests, and shields from civil liability for police officers who kill so-called rioters, see US Protest Law Tracker, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker
[https://perma.cc/2DJG-MQKU].
44. See, e.g., McCullen, 573 U.S. at 477.
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classrooms.45 As of August 2018, sixteen states had statutory bans on carrying
concealed firearms on university campuses; twenty-three states gave universities
discretion to decide whether to allow concealed firearms; and ten states mandated concealed carry on campuses, usually with limited exceptions.46 Numerous
states are presently considering legislation to create or extend campus carry mandates.47 Five years ago, twenty-one states had statutory bans and twenty-two gave
universities discretion to set campus carry policies.48 In 2011, those numbers were
twenty-nine ban states and nineteen discretion states, with Utah the sole mandatory carry state.49 The trend toward mandatory campus carry has strong momentum.
The arguments for and against mandatory campus carry track those from the
public protest setting. On the gun rights side, the argument that campus carry will
deter “bad guys with guns” appears highly dubious. Accordingly, gun rights advocates emphasize individual autonomy: gun owners should be able to defend
themselves on campuses just like anywhere else.50 Free speech advocates counter
that a concealed carry mandate will cause professors, students, and others on
campus to self-censor for fear of sparking a violent response, thus chilling speech
and undermining universities’ core mission of promoting free, vigorous exchanges of ideas.51
Some free speech advocates frame their objection to mandatory campus carry
as a defense of academic freedom.52 Unfortunately, academic freedom is a highly
contested and doctrinally underdeveloped concept.53 If academic freedom belongs to public universities as institutions, then it arguably has no role in protecting against actions of their state governments, because state universities are generally subdivisions of the states that govern them.54 In contrast, if academic
45. No court or commentator to date has posited a Second Amendment right to carry a firearm on
state university campuses. See Shaundra K. Lewis, Crossfire on Compulsory Campus Carry Laws: When
the First and Second Amendments Collide, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2109, 2135–37 (2017).
46. Guns on Campus: Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 14, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/6V5Q-58WC].
47. See Teri Lyn Hinds, 2018 State Legislation Governing Guns on Campus, NAT’L ASS’N OF
STUDENT PERS. ADMIN’RS (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.naspa.org/blog/2018-state-legislation-governingguns-on-campus [https://perma.cc/WF5E-23VA] (reporting on pending or proposed legislation to promote campus carry rights in nine states in 2018).
48. See Brandi H. LaBanc et al., The Debate Over Campus-Based Gun Control Legislation, 40 J.C.
& U.L. 397, 402–03 (2014) (citing National Conference of State Legislatures data current as of 2014).
49. Lewis, supra note 45, at 2113.
50. See, e.g., Erik Gilbert, Campus Carry Is Not About Preventing Mass Shootings, INSIDE HIGHER
EDUC. (June 12, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2017/06/12/campus-carry-about-right-individual-self-defense-not-preventing-mass-shootings [https://perma.cc/BC4G-QT9Y] (advocating the individual autonomy argument for campus carry over the deterrence argument).
51. See Lewis, supra note 45, at 2111–12.
52. See, e.g., id. at 2117–29.
53. See generally Karen Petroski, Lessons for Academic Freedom Law: The California Approach to
University Autonomy and Accountability, 32 J.C. & U.L. 149 (2005).
54. Two state high courts have held that universities lack authority under state laws to restrict firearms on public university campuses. See Regents of Univ. of Colo. v. Students for Concealed Carry on
Campus, 271 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2012); Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109 (Utah 2006); but see Lewis,
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freedom belongs to individuals within public universities, then it should protect
those individuals from state suppression of their academic speech and learning.
However, while the Supreme Court has recognized certain First Amendment
protections for university faculty55 and students,56 the Court has never defined the
full contours of academic freedom in public university settings. The free speech
objection to campus carry seems best conceptualized as an ordinary First Amendment argument.
One federal court has categorically rejected any First Amendment concern
with mandatory campus carry. In Glass v. Paxton, a group of professors challenged a Texas law, passed in 2015, that forced state university campuses to permit concealed carry.57 The professors contended that concealed firearms in their
classrooms would cause them to self-censor out of fear that a student with a concealed firearm would use the weapon to intimidate them or their students.58 The
Fifth Circuit threw the case out for lack of standing.59 The court accused the professors of trying to “manufacture standing by self-censoring [their] speech based
on what [they] allege[] to be a reasonable probability that concealed-carry license
holders will intimidate professors and students in the classroom.”60 The court
held that, for the professors even to get a hearing on the merits, they would need
to show “a certainty that a license-holder will illegally brandish a firearm in a
classroom.”61 In other words, the fear of guns cannot produce a judicially cognizable chilling of speech until and unless someone actually uses a gun for intimidation—at which point, of course, judicial redress would no longer be possible.
Even then, the next instance of intimidation would not be provable with certainty.
The Fifth Circuit’s holding effectively forecloses any legal remedy for concealed
firearms’ chilling of speech.
If the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Glass prevails nationwide, then First
Amendment law will have no role in limiting public carry on campus, or for that
matter in public protests. Even so, the interest in an open and robust learning
environment can and should inform policy debates. Mandatory campus carry
provides dubious benefits while causing substantial harms. Recent studies indicate that both professors and students would be less likely to teach and engage in
debate over controversial topics in the presence of a firearm.62 On the other side
supra note 45, at 2118–20 (advocating a view of institutional academic freedom that would protect some
measure of autonomy for public universities from state control).
55. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding that academic freedom principles bar public universities from conditioning employment of faculty on loyalty oaths designed to ferret
out Communists).
56. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that a public college’s refusal to recognize
a student group violated student members’ First Amendment freedom of association).
57. Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 236–37 (5th Cir. 2018).
58. Id. at 236.
59. Id. at 237–42.
60. Id. at 242.
61. Id. at 241.
62. See EMILY REIMAL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., GUNS ON COLLEGE
CAMPUSES: STUDENTS’ AND UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS’ PERCEPTIONS OF CAMPUS CARRY
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of the dispute, no evidence appears to show that concealed carry makes campuses
safer. To the contrary, a public health study on campus firearms shows that public
carry laws increase violence.63 The study emphasizes the distinctive dangers of
guns on university campuses because of young adults’ cognitive developmental
limitations, vulnerability to mental illness, and high incidence of alcohol abuse.64
Many students and others claim that campus carry degrades their autonomy by
chilling their speech and endangering their safety.65
The debate over campus carry represents a stark collision of the interests in
gun rights and free speech. If we take the free speech objections to campus carry
seriously, then treating university campuses as gun-free “sensitive places,” as permitted by Heller, makes sense.66 That solution does not present the same problems as in the public protest setting. Universities, unlike protests, are distinctive
institutions under First Amendment law, subject to substantial government administration.67 Barring firearms on campuses would protect important free
speech interests while only marginally affecting armed self-defense.
B. Gun Rights vs. Public Information
Discussions of guns, gun rights, and gun regulations matter deeply to policymakers and to ordinary people in both their citizen and consumer roles. Accordingly, everyone should favor engaged political deliberation and informed public
discussion about guns. Gun rights advocates, however, increasingly seek to suppress public information about guns. Those efforts have taken several different
forms: actions to suppress legislative debates about gun regulation and lawsuits
LEGISLATION IN KANSAS 9 (Aug. 2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/100963/guns_on_college_campuses_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QLY-5VYS] (describing a study on students’ willingness to engage in debate with an armed student); Colleen Flaherty, Not in My Classroom,
INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/04/28/study-professors-widely-oppose-campus-carry-inimical-academic-freedom-fewer-would
[https://perma.cc/EDK8PPHU] (reporting on preliminary results of a study conducted by University of Texas Ph.D. candidate
Joslyn Krismer).
63. See DANIEL W. WEBSTER ET AL., FIREARMS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES: RESEARCH EVIDENCE
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 13–16 (2016), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johnshopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/_archive-2019/_pdfs/GunsOnCampus.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5Q5B-Y876] (describing differences in violent crime rates between right-to-carry and non-right-to-carry
states).
64. See id. at 16–21; see also Brian J. Siebel, The Case Against Guns on Campus, 18 GEO. MASON
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 319, 323–34 (2008) (discussing various dangers caused by guns in campus environments).
65. See, e.g., REIMAL ET AL., supra note 62, at 6–12 (reporting Kansas public university students’
and administrators’ concerns and predominantly negative views about the effects of concealed firearms
on campus); Michael R. Cavanaugh et al., Student Attitudes Toward Concealed Handguns on Campus at
2 Universities, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2245 (2012) (reporting strong majorities of students at two public
universities in Texas and Washington who opposed concealed handguns on campus); Flaherty, supra note
62 (discussing results of a survey in which faculty members at a large southern research university, likely
the University of Texas, overwhelmingly opposed and feared negative consequences from a campus carry
mandate).
66. See DiGiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 370 (Va. 2011)
(holding a state university campus to be a “sensitive place” within the meaning of Heller).
67. See Schauer, supra note 40, at 1274 (discussing universities as special First Amendment institutions).
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about gun violence; suits to block states from publicly disclosing facts about gun
ownership; and laws that bar doctors from asking and telling patients about the
public health dangers of guns.
1. Suppression of Political, Legal, and Public Debate About Guns
The gun lobby’s furthest-reaching strategy for blocking government consideration of gun regulations has been to starve public and legislative debates by
barring federal agencies from collecting and reporting information about gun violence. In 1996 Congress enacted the Dickey Amendment, which banned all
funding for research on guns and public health from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).68 Fifteen years later, Congress extended that funding ban to the National Institutes of Health.69 Both bans resulted from concerted lobbying by the
National Rifle Association (NRA) in retaliation for scientific research that undercut the gun rights agenda.70 In 2018, responding to the recent wave of mass
shootings, Congress lifted the CDC funding ban; but Congress allocated no actual
funds to gun research, and researchers doubt the policy change will prove to be
anything more than an empty gesture.71 The research ban has let the NRA denigrate public health concerns about gun violence without having to confront any
empirical pushback from the government bodies best situated to gather and analyze relevant data.72 Even the Dickey Amendment’s architect and namesake
eventually relented, acknowledging that funding federal research is essential to
formulating effective federal policy on gun violence.73 Although the government
has discretion to allocate its resources, imposing a blanket ban on using government funds to learn more about a crucial policy matter embraces ignorance, secrecy, and fear. Such cowardice is antithetical to our First Amendment tradition.

68. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (enacting
Dickey Amendment).
69. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2011).
70. See Christine Jamieson, Gun Violence Research: History of the Federal Funding Freeze, AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N (Feb. 2013),
https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2013/02/gun-violence
[https://perma.cc/4GWU-WN9P].
71. See Nell Greenfieldboyce, Spending Bill Lets CDC Study Gun Violence; But Researchers Are
Skeptical It Will Help, NPR (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/03/23/
596413510/proposed-budget-allows-cdc-to-study-gun-violence-researchers-skeptical [https://perma.cc/
C3JT-W5EF].
72. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, The NRA Has Blocked Gun Violence Research for 20 Years. Let’s End
Its Stranglehold on Science, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/lafi-hiltzik-gun-research-funding-20160614-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/2AWE-XFNU] (documenting the NRA’s’ campaign to ban government funding for gun violence research and explaining the consequence that “[a] generation of researchers was discouraged from entering a field in which grants were
hard to come by and the political push-back intense”).
73. See Jay Dickey & Mark Rosenberg, We Won’t Know the Cause of Gun Violence Until We Look
for It, WASH. POST (July 27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-wont-know-the-causeof-gun-violence-until-we-look-for-it/2012/07/27/gJQAPfenEX_story.html [https://perma.cc/7CPFUEPU] (contending “that scientific research should be conducted into preventing firearm injuries and
that ways to prevent firearm deaths can be found without encroaching on the rights of legitimate gun
owners”).

BOOK PROOF - MAGARIAN (DO NOT DELETE)

180

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

8/4/2020 10:52 PM

[Vol. 83:169

The gun lobby has also restricted legislative consideration of gun regulations
by persuading most states to enact preemption statutes, which remove or restrict
local governments’ traditional authority to regulate firearms. By itself, preemption implicates questions of government structure and does not disturb free
speech interests. Several states, however, weaponize preemption by imposing legal liability on individual legislators who violate preemption statutes. Florida and
Arizona subject violators to fines of up to $50,000 along with removal from office.74 Florida, Kentucky, and Mississippi make violators liable for damages and
attorney’s fees, as do Iowa and Minnesota in narrower circumstances.75 Kentucky
even exposes violators to criminal punishment.76 These preemption statutes leave
somewhat unclear what constitutes a “violation,” but presumably any effort by a
local official to regulate the preempted field would violate preemption. A legislator thus could face liability even for introducing or sponsoring a proposed gun
regulation as a symbolic protest against gun violence. The First Amendment does
not protect legislators’ exercise of government power.77 On the other hand, constitutional protections for legislative debates, such as the federal Constitution’s
Speech or Debate Clause,78 closely parallel constitutional speech protections.
Moreover, barring legislatures from considering gun regulations betrays constituents’ First Amendment interests by foreclosing the policy information that legislative debates generate.
Paralleling state restrictions on legislative consideration of gun regulations,
the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) bars most
lawsuits in federal and state courts against manufacturers and sellers of guns and
ammunition for deaths and injuries from gun violence.79 The PLCAA has broadly
succeeded in choking off litigation against the gun industry, especially manufacturers.80 However, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that the Act did
not bar families of the children and adults murdered in the 2012 Sandy Hook
Elementary School gun massacre from suing the murder weapon’s manufacturer
for promoting the weapon’s unlawful use.81 Like allocation of funds and preemption of local gun regulations, creation and restriction of legal causes of action lies

74. Preemption of Local Laws, GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/preemption-of-local-laws/
[https://perma.cc/9MVJ-3GDR].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Nev. Comm. on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117 (2011) (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to a state requirement that legislators not vote on matters as to which they have conflicts of
interest).
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 cl. 1.
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012).
80. See generally VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE PROTECTION OF LAWFUL
COMMERCE IN ARMS ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF LIMITING TORT LIABILITY OF GUN MANUFACTURERS
(Dec. 20, 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42871.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KB9-2ER2].
81. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, 331 Conn. 53, 157–58 (Conn. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.
Remington Arms Co. v. Soto, No. 19-168, 2019 WL 5875142 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2019).
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within the government’s authority. However, also like those other measures, legal immunity insulates gun violence from public scrutiny. Lawsuits not only correct substantive wrongs but also advance First Amendment values by informing
public policy debates. The PLCAA, by shielding the gun industry from most legal
liability, cuts off an important source of public information and potential policy
reform.
In their most extreme and frightening repudiation of democratic politics, gun
rights partisans have used the threat of violence conveyed by the open carrying
of firearms to silence legislative deliberation. With increasing frequency, armed
activists and sometimes elected officials openly carry firearms into legislative
chambers and other government buildings.82 This trend took an ominous turn in
June 2019 in Oregon.83 The state Senate’s Republicans tried to prevent a quorum
for a vote on a carbon emissions tax by hiding outside the state. The governor
authorized state police to find the legislators, and Republican Senator Brian
Boquist threatened to attack the Senate president and to kill officers if they came
looking for him.84 His threats inspired anti-government “patriot” militias, including the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters, to offer the Republican legislators
armed protection. The militias then called for an armed show of force at the state
capitol to protest the Democrats’ scheduled weekend legislative session. The
state police viewed the militias’ planned protest as a credible threat of violence,
and the Senate leadership canceled the session. A year later, armed protesters
who opposed Michigan’s measures to fight the novel coronavirus stormed the
state capitol, leading the legislature to cancel a later session.85 Such violent
chilling of legislative deliberation corrodes the indispensable First Amendment
norm of resolving policy differences through political debate.
Gun rights advocates have even begun using government power to penalize
private criticism of gun rights. After a February 2018 gun massacre killed 17 people at a Parkland, Florida high school, public pressure mounted for companies to

82. See, e.g., Laura Vozzella, On the Senate Floor With a Gun on Her Hip, Republican Says Packing
Heat Can Deter Violence, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginiapolitics/on-the-senate-floor-with-a-gun-on-her-hip-republican-says-she-will-deter-violence/2019/01/16/75cf17c4-19d0-11e9-9ebf-c5fed1b7a081_story.html [https://perma.cc/S8EQ-8TV7] (describing Virginia Senator Amanda Chase’s open carrying of a firearm on the Senate floor).
83. This account is drawn from Aaron Mesh, Oregon Senate Cancels Saturday Session Amid Reports
of Militia Groups Protesting at Capitol, WILLAMETTE WEEK (June 21, 2019),
https://www.wweek.com/news/state/2019/06/21/oregon-senate-cancels-saturday-session-amid-reports-ofmilitia-groups-protesting-at-capitol/ [https://perma.cc/9JVQ-5UC7], and Jason Wilson, Oregon Senator
Walkout: ‘Patriot’ Groups Vow to Protect Republicans Who Fled State, GUARDIAN (June 21, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jun/21/oregon-senator-walkout-patriot-groups-vow-to-protect-republicans-who-fled-state [https://perma.cc/ZZG4-KT6P].
84. See Hillary Borud, Oregon Senator Who Threatened State Police Must Give Notice Before Returning to the Capitol, OREGONIAN (July 8, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.com/news/2019/07/oregon-senator-who-threatened-state-police-must-give-notice-before-returning-to-the-capitol.html
[https://perma.cc/4TK3-L5SA].
85. See Carol Thompson, Michigan Capitol Will Be Closed During Protest Because Legislature
Won’t Meet, LANSING ST. J. (May 13, 2020), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/2020/
05/13/michigan-capitol-closed-during-coronavirus-protest/5183573002/ [https://perma.cc/2G2G-X8RP].
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end business relationships with the NRA. Delta Air Lines announced that, in an
effort to remain neutral in political battles over gun regulation, it was eliminating
a promotional discount it had offered to NRA members. Georgia’s legislature
responded by amending a pending tax bill to remove a jet fuel tax break that
would have saved Delta $40 million. State Republican leaders made clear that
the tax change was payback for Delta’s policy shift.86 Georgia thus punished
Delta for its expressive act and sought to chill the speech of other companies that
might follow suit. The First Amendment bars the government from imposing financial penalties on expressions of ideas.87 Georgia’s retaliation against Delta
amounts to a frontal assault, in the name of gun rights, on private speech and on
the broader First Amendment interest in informed public debate.
2. Gun Privacy vs. Government Disclosures
Gun rights advocates have begun to assert privacy interests in their gun ownership. Tracking the Supreme Court’s recognition that effective exercise of
speech and assembly rights sometimes requires shielding speakers’ identities
from public view,88 these new “gun privacy” arguments posit anonymity as necessary for the effective exercise of the right to keep and bear arms. Belying their
formal parallels to First Amendment doctrine, gun privacy claims substantively
undermine the public’s First Amendment interest in access to government information about matters of public concern.
Most states shield the identities of gun permit holders from public view.89 A
New York law, however, makes handgun permit holders’ names and addresses
matters of public record.90 A local newspaper approached a county government
for the names of gun permit holders. In Doe No. 1 v. Putnam County,91 gun owners asked a federal judge to declare the law unconstitutional. They invoked both
the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy and the Second Amendment right
to keep and bear arms, arguing that public knowledge of permit holders’ identities would expose them to public recriminations and that criminals would use the

86. Richard Fausset, Georgia Passes Bill That Stings Delta Over N.R.A. Position, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/business/delta-nra-georgia.html [https://perma.cc/4Q4PFLVW].
87. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims’ Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (striking
down a law that garnished earnings from convicted criminals’ writings to provide financial compensation
for their victims).
88. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that the First
Amendment protects the right to distribute anonymous political leaflets); NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S.
240 (1959) (holding that the First Amendment protects a political association’s right not to disclose its
membership list to the state).
89. Jim Malewitz, Lawmakers Move Swiftly to Block Release of Gun Permit Records, STATELINE
(Mar. 7, 2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/03/07/lawmakers-move-swiftly-to-block-release-of-gun-permit-records [https://perma.cc/GPU6-XQCH].
90. See N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(5)(a).
91. 344 F. Supp. 3d 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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information to figure out from whom they could steal guns.92 Although the district court dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claim,93 it let the Second
Amendment claim proceed because the threat of public disclosure might deter
people from applying for firearms licenses.94 The court drew a simplistic parallel
to First Amendment doctrine, formulating with little analysis a Second Amendment equivalent to the First Amendment prohibition on government actions that
chill speech.95
The Putnam County court declared that “the licensing scheme in question
applies to handgun ownership in one’s home—in other words, it veers toward the
core of the self-defense right recognized in Heller.”96 Accordingly, the court applied heightened Second Amendment scrutiny. The state claimed important interests in informing the public about matters of governance and in engaging the
informed public in enforcement of firearms licensure requirements. The court
grudgingly allowed that “in the abstract, these may be important governmental
interests,” but it declared that “one could be skeptical about what additional assistance the public could provide in enforcing the licensing regime above and beyond what is gained from disclosure to just the government.”97 The court thus
treated the plaintiffs’ asserted Second Amendment autonomy interest as far
weightier than the collective interest in informed self-governance. That hierarchy
of values strongly suggests that the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment argument will
ultimately prevail in the case.
Another gun privacy challenge, National Rifle Association v. Bondi,98 asserted
that gun rights advocates should be able to anonymously challenge a gun regulation in court. The NRA, challenging a Florida gun regulation in the wake of the
2018 Parkland, Florida gun massacre, moved for a plaintiff and a witness to proceed under pseudonyms.99 The plaintiff and the witness claimed that naming
them publicly would expose them to threats, harassment, and possibly violence.100
In addition, a former NRA president testified that she received harassing emails
and phone calls after the Parkland shootings.101 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require parties in federal suits to proceed under their own names.102
92. Id. at 522. That argument carries some irony, as Second Amendment advocates usually insist
that public knowledge of gun possession deters crime.
93. Id. at 539–41 (finding that possessing a gun permit falls outside of the right to informational
privacy). One earlier state court decision barred government disclosure of gun ownership records on
privacy grounds, but that decision rested entirely on the court’s interpretation of a state privacy statute.
See Mager v. Dept. of State Police, 595 N.W.2d 142 (Mich. 1999).
94. Putnam County, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 535–39.
95. See id. at 536–37.
96. Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bondi, No. 4:18cv137-MW/CAS (N.D. Fla. May 13, 2018) (Order Denying
Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonyms).
99. Id. slip op. at 2.
100. Id. at 4–5.
101. Id. at 5.
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a).
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Courts have allowed some litigants to proceed anonymously (as in Putnam
County, where the plaintiffs challenged the legislature’s very power to disclose
their names), but the Supreme Court has never announced rules to govern litigants’ requests for anonymity. The district judge in Bondi declared that “[i]f it
were entirely up to this Court, the Court would not hesitate to grant the NRA’s
motion,” citing “the vitriol that has infected public discourse about the Second
Amendment.”103 However, a survey of Eleventh Circuit precedent led the judge
to conclude that identification as a gun owner did not fall within the narrow range
of conditions that warranted anonymity.104 The court’s reasoning closely tracks
the Putnam County court’s denial of the New York gun owners’ Fourteenth
Amendment privacy claim.105
Putnam County and Bondi give gun privacy arguments a meaningful legal
toehold. True, the district courts in both cases denied claims grounded in conventional privacy principles.106 However, the New York court in Putnam County recognized a strong Second Amendment basis for a gun privacy principle. Why the
NRA did not directly invoke the Second Amendment in its Bondi motion is unclear, but the Florida court’s reasoning in that case would accommodate an argument that the Second Amendment provides a distinct constitutional right for gun
rights litigants to proceed anonymously.
Gun privacy arguments, however, present greater problems than either court
acknowledged. In First Amendment doctrine, which provides the template for
Second Amendment gun privacy claims, the Supreme Court’s anonymity decisions have barred the government from collecting certain information about expressive activity, based on fears that the government itself would use that information to harass or punish speakers.107 In contrast, the Court has declined to
block the government from publicly disclosing information it had already lawfully
collected. For example, the Roberts Court in Doe v. Reed108 rejected an argument
closely parallel to the claims in Putnam County and Bondi: that the First Amendment should protect signers of a controversial referendum petition from having
their names disclosed under a state open records law.109
Moreover, the courts in Putnam County and Bondi (and for that matter the
Supreme Court in Doe v. Reed) undervalued the public’s First Amendment in-

103. Bondi, slip op. at 6 (footnote omitted). Aside from the NRA’s witnesses, the only examples the
court gave of “vitriol” in Second Amendment discourse involved threats and harassment by gun rights
advocates against gun violence survivors and advocates of gun regulation. See id. at 6–7 nn.5, 6.
104. Id. at 7–16.
105. See id. at 15 (emphasizing “that there are few privacy concerns at issue in this case”) (footnote
omitted).
106. Jody Lynee Madeira, critiquing this denial, has sought to ground gun privacy claims in a sociological theory that encroachments on gun owners’ privacy cause cognizable stigmatic injury. See generally
Jody Lynee Madeira, A Secret Weapon?: Applying Privacy Doctrine to the Second Amendment, 46
HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 555 (2019).
107. See cases cited supra note 88.
108. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
109. See id. at 202.
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terest in access to politically salient government information. For example, journalists across the country have used gun permit information to expose important
government failings, including unlawful issuance of gun permits to felons and
people involuntarily committed to mental health facilities.110 We cannot hope to
govern ourselves effectively and wisely without thorough information about public issues and controversies. This is a core insight of First Amendment doctrine111
and theory.112 The information necessary for self-government includes the identities of people whom the government has licensed to hold the power of deadly
force and of people who ask courts to overturn legislative policy choices. The
Supreme Court has made clear that enforcing public ignorance violates the First
Amendment.113
3. Gun Secrecy vs. Professional Communication
A final collision between gun rights and public information arises from government efforts to promote gun rights by suppressing communication between
professionals and the people they serve. This collision inverts the structure of the
gun privacy cases. It involves First Amendment objections, focused on speakers’
expressive autonomy rights, to government policies grounded in Second Amendment interests.
A Florida statute, the Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act,114 included several restrictions on physicians’ communications with patients about firearms. The Act
barred physicians from keeping medical records about patients’ gun ownership,
from asking patients whether they owned guns, and from “harass[ing]” patients
about gun ownership.115 In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida,116 a group of
physicians and medical organizations challenged those restrictions as violating
physicians’ First Amendment freedom of speech. The state sought to justify the
provisions based on several interests, including its desire to protect Floridians’
Second Amendment rights.117 Analyzing the case under heightened scrutiny, the

110. See Malewitz, supra note 89.
111. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (imposing First Amendment constraints on public officials’ ability to recover for defamation, based on “a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).
112. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens’ Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769–70 (1976)
(rejecting enforced ignorance about commercial prices as a strategy for protecting consumers from undesirable effects of market competition); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers Case), 403
U.S. 713, 723–24 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (rejecting government secrecy as a means of safeguarding national security).
114. Ch. 2011-112, 2011 Fla. Laws 1776 (codified at Fla. Stat. §§ 790.338, 456.072, 395.1055 & 381.026).
115. Id. § 1, 2011 Fla. Laws at 1777 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 790.338); see also Mobeen H. Rathore,
Physician “Gag Laws” and Gun Safety, AMA J. ETHICS (Apr. 2014), https://journalofethics.amaassn.org/article/physician-gag-laws-and-gun-safety/2014-04 [https://perma.cc/5JXR-N395] (explaining
that several other states have enacted or considered similar laws).
116. 848 F.3d 1293 (2017) (en banc).
117. Id. at 1312–16.
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en banc Eleventh Circuit struck down the provisions as impermissible contentbased restrictions on the physicians’ speech.118 As to the Second Amendment justification, the court held that the state had failed to show that the communications
restricted by the Act violated anyone’s Second Amendment rights; that regulating private conduct was an ineffectual way to protect Second Amendment rights;
and that, in any event, the First Amendment bars suppressing information as a
means of protecting Second Amendment rights.119
Wollschlaeger, much more than Bondi or Putnam County, takes the public’s
interest in access to information seriously. Wollschlaeger, however, differs from
those cases in two important, related ways. First, the Firearms Owners’ Privacy
Act denied information to people not in their capacity as self-governing citizens
but rather in their capacity as consumers of medical services. Thus, Wollschlaeger
resonates with present First Amendment doctrine’s preference for interests in
private autonomy and economic liberty over interests in democratic political participation.120 Second, the only First Amendment interest Wollschlaeger legally
vindicates is the physician plaintiffs’ interest in expressive autonomy. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the state’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of standing
because “the individual plaintiffs, as doctors, wish to say and do what they believe
[the Act] prevents them from saying and doing.”121 Had the Act been challenged
not by doctors but instead by patients who claimed the Act denied their First
Amendment right to hear their doctors’ insights about the public health dangers
of firearms, the First Amendment challenge might well have failed.
Taken together, Wollschlaeger and the gun privacy cases suggest a mixed resolution for collisions between Second Amendment gun rights interests and First
Amendment public information interests. Wollschlaeger shows that speakers’
First Amendment right to expressive autonomy defeats gun rights interests not
squarely recognized in Heller. However, Putnam County suggests that a judicially
recognized Second Amendment interest in gun privacy defeats the First Amendment value of public information.

118. Id. at 1320–23.
119. Id. at 1312–14.
120. See GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST
AMENDMENT 33–64 (2017).
121. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1304.
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C. Competing Accusations About Causes of Gun Violence
On the numbingly frequent occasions when mass shootings capture public attention, gun control advocates largely blame gun proliferation, pressing for various new gun regulations.122 In contrast, advocates for gun rights categorically oppose new regulations.123 They believe that many or most gun restrictions would
violate the Second Amendment, and they fear that conceding any causal connection between gun proliferation and gun violence would undermine gun rights.124
This hard line puts gun rights advocates in a difficult position. If they deny the
human costs of gun violence, they appear callous and extremist; but if they
acknowledge gun violence as a distinctive social problem, they undermine their
raison d’être.
To solve this dilemma, gun rights advocates propose alternative responses.
Often they advocate nonlegal measures, typically shifts from supposedly permissive cultural norms to more conservative ones.125 When gun rights advocates do
propose regulatory responses, their proposals shift the focus away from guns and
toward measures that threaten other liberties: more power for law enforcement,
more constraints on mentally ill people, gun regulations strictly limited to political “out groups” like foreign nationals.126 Most vigorously and commonly, gun
rights advocates seek to shift the blame for gun violence from guns to expressive
materials, mainly violent video games. They argue that images of violence in popular media desensitize young people, leading to aberrant violent acts that incidentally involve firearms.127 The President of the United States has recently made

122. See, e.g., Keeping Our Schools Safe: A Plan to Stop Mass Shootings and End Gun Violence in
American Schools, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Feb. 11, 2019), https://everytownresearch.org/reports/keeping-schools-safe-plan-stop-mass-shootings-end-gun-violence-american-schools/
[https://perma.cc/3G9N-8TS9]; see also Margot Sanger-Katz & Quoctrung Bui, How to Reduce Mass
Shooting Deaths? Experts Rank Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/upshot/how-to-reduce-mass-shooting-deaths-experts-say-these-gun-laws-couldhelp.html [https://perma.cc/ZT7E-PTXJ] (compiling and discussing proposed gun regulations).
123. See, e.g., Tell Your U.S. Senators and Representative to Oppose Gun Control, NAT’L RIFLE
ASS’N–INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20190813/tellyour-us-senators-and-representative-to-oppose-gun-control [https://perma.cc/T8JE-3GQE].
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., David French, New Gun Policies Won’t Stop Mass Shootings, But People Can, NAT’L
REV. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/02/new-gun-policies-wont-stop-massshootings-but-people-can [https://perma.cc/2JDK-C9ZT]; Christopher Mele & Christina Caron, Oliver
North Blames ‘Culture of Violence’ for Mass Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/us/nra-oliver-north.html [https://perma.cc/9ABG-U5CB] (reporting remarks of
the NRA’s incoming president).
126. See, e.g., Anna Merod, How the NRA Has Responded to Mass Shootings Over the Years, NBC
NEWS (Jun. 15, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/orlando-nightclub-massacre/how-nra-hasresponded-mass-shootings-over-years-n592551 [https://perma.cc/5LJZ-Y7AJ] (describing NRA
officials’ blaming of mass shootings on radical Islam, a failed mental health system, and insufficient
funding for police).
127. See, e.g., Mike Jaccarino, ‘Training Simulation:’ Mass Killers Often Share Obsession With Violent
Video Games, FOX NEWS (Sep. 12, 2013), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/training-simulation-mass-killers-often-share-obsession-with-violent-video-games [https://perma.cc/9LXK-SB89].
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this argument.128 Proponents of the theory that mass culture causes mass shootings seek restrictions on the First Amendment rights of popular media creators
and their audiences.
The biggest problem with blaming gun violence on popular culture is that empirical evidence abjectly fails to support the causal linkage.129 A psychologist who
surveyed available empirical data concluded that “‘links’ between mass shooters
and video games are based on illusory correlation and confirmation bias.”130 The
Supreme Court has squarely rejected legal and empirical arguments that realworld violence justifies relaxing First Amendment protection for video games.131
Other courts have similarly rejected states’ attempted empirical linkages between
video games and violence.132
In contrast to the constitutional hazards of efforts to regulate video games,
the types of gun regulations most commonly proposed in the wake of mass shootings—strengthened background checks and bans on certain military-grade weapons and ammunition—seem among the least likely sorts of regulations to violate
the Second Amendment. Heller itself validates “conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sales of arms” and regulations of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”133 Whether these proposed gun regulations will gain traction politically is of
course a different question.
The ease with which Second Amendment partisans default to throwing
speech they dislike under the gun rights bus underscores the broader tension between the interests in gun rights and expressive freedom. First and Second
Amendment interests have found great trouble coexisting, let alone working harmoniously to protect some abstract, unitary conception of liberty.

128. See Devan Cole, Trump, McCarthy Cite Video Games as a Driver Behind Mass Shootings, CNN
(Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/05/politics/kevin-mccarthy-mass-shootings-video-games/
index.html [https://perma.cc/B8X3-BGNR] (describing Trump’s condemnation of violent video games).
129. See Christopher J. Ferguson, Violent Video Games, Mass Shootings, and the Supreme Court:
Lessons for the Legal Community in the Wake of Recent Free Speech Cases and Mass Shootings, 17 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 553, 557–59, 560 (2014) (summarizing and discussing methodological flaws with studies
that tie violent conduct to video games and stating that “little evidence has emerged to link violent video
games with violence-related outcomes”); Patrick M. Markey et al., Violent Video Games and Real-World
Violence: Rhetoric Versus Data, 4 PSYCHOL. POPULAR MEDIA CULTURE 277 (2015) (explaining that
studies suggest a decrease in violent crime corresponding to the increase in violent video game sales);
Andrew K. Przybylski & Netta Weinstein, Violent Video Game Engagement Is Not Associated With Adolescents’ Aggressive Behaviour: Evidence From a Registered Report, 6 ROYAL SOC. OPEN SCI.
171474 (2019) (reporting that violent video games are not associated with aggressive behavior).
130. Ferguson, supra note 129, at 561.
131. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
132. See generally Richard Dillio, A Critical Miss: Video Games, Violence, and Ineffective Legislation,
48 FIRST AMEND. STUD. 110 (2014) (discussing court decisions and critiquing empirical arguments).
133. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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III
NORMATIVE TENSIONS IN SPEECH-ARMS COLLISIONS
Collisions between free speech and gun rights follow normative fault lines
that help to explain how these two interests end up clashing so deeply and frequently. This Part briefly sketches two normative oppositions that seem particularly important for understanding the speech-arms tension. Where gun rights require a deep commitment to individual autonomy, free speech depends on a
robust vision of communal interaction.134 Similarly, where gun rights promote a
form of social and political stability, free speech opens opportunities for social
and political dynamism.
A. Individual Autonomy vs. Communal Interaction
Collisions between First and Second Amendment interests pit communal
against individual values. Arguments for gun rights routinely appeal to a highly
individualistic vision of the bearer of arms. Certainly the gun rights movement
and gun culture gain strength from numbers in the NRA’s wildly effective lobbying efforts. Bearing a firearm, however, is a solitary enterprise. In contrast, free
speech entails communication between and among multiple people and entities.
The Supreme Court, in assessing what counts as speech for First Amendment
purposes, considers the perspectives of both speaker and audience.135 Free speech
arguments often start with the paradigm of the individual speaker, but they gain
force from the value of public information for communal interaction. The distinction between the essentially individualist nature of gun rights and the essentially
communal nature of free speech defines a crucial normative tension in speecharms collisions.
Gun rights claims in speech-arms collisions appeal centrally to individual autonomy. Open carry activists who want to bring their guns to public protests and
concealed carry activists who want to bring their guns to university campuses
claim, first and foremost, a right to defend themselves wherever they go. Gun
privacy arguments and bans on physician inquiries about guns seek to import to
the Second Amendment the quintessentially autonomous “right of the individual
to be let alone.”136 When the NRA scuttles federal funding for public health research on guns or secures legal immunity for gun makers and sellers, it is really
helping a powerful industry. Its political rhetoric, however, emphasizes the rights
and concerns of the individual gun owner.
Individualism permeates the gun rights movement. For decades that movement’s defining goal was to establish that the Second Amendment protects not a
collective right of the people to form an armed militia but rather an individual

134. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 15 (1996) (“What the phrase ‘the freedom of
speech’ in the First Amendment refers to is a social state of affairs, not the action of an individual or
institution.”).
135. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974).
136. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).
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right to have a gun.137 When the Supreme Court fulfilled that goal in District of
Columbia v. Heller,138 the Court’s opinion subordinated the most historically salient justification for the Second Amendment—the collective interest in resisting
tyrannical government—to a disaggregated individual right to personal self-defense. The Court read the Militia Clause out of the Second Amendment.139 As
Reva Siegel has pointed out, the Heller Court’s highly idiosyncratic “originalist”
interpretation of the Second Amendment really operationalizes the individualist
political ideology of the gun rights movement and the gun culture.140 That culture
exalts the heroic individualism of the gun owner while condemning gun regulation as a socialist project to oppress that gun owner and take his guns away.141
The specious “good guys with guns” argument for guns’ communal value adds
little to the essentially individualistic argument for gun rights.
Many free speech arguments in speech-arms collisions begin with individual
autonomy. Opponents of open carry at protests and concealed carry on campuses
contend that fear of guns will chill speakers, denying individuals the effective
right to say what they please. Litigants who want to sue gun manufacturers and
companies like Delta that express qualms about gun rights assert their autonomy
to push back against guns and gun culture. The Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger
v. Governor of Florida142 became the only court to vindicate a First Amendment
right against gun rights interests because so far it is the only court to have heard
a complaint that a government promoted gun rights at the expense of speakers’
expressive autonomy.
Even in those collisions, however, expressive autonomy interests stand alongside broader First Amendment interests in public discourse. Critics of public
carry worry not just that public guns will chill speakers but that the chill will deprive audiences of valuable information. Gun violence litigation not only redresses private injuries but also informs public debates and policy discussions
about gun violence. The legal analysis in Wollschlaeger may have turned on physicians’ expressive autonomy, but the essential interest in the case was patients’
access to fully informative medical care. The free speech interests in other
speech-arms collisions are predominantly or wholly communal. Defunding government research on gun violence deprives the political community of valuable
137. See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2000) (tracing the development of the individual right argument in late twentieth
century legal scholarship); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008) (situating the Second Amendment individual rights argument in
gun rights politics).
138. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
139. See id. at 595–600; see also Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First
Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 75-79 (2012) (critiquing the Heller Court’s abandonment of the Militia Clause).
140. See generally Siegel, supra note 137.
141. See, e.g., Brett Samuels, NRA’s LaPierre Warns Conservatives of ‘Socialist State’, HILL (Feb. 22,
2018),
https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/375044-lapierre-warns-conservatives-of-socialist-state
[https://perma.cc/EG6L-FTVV].
142. 848 F.3d 1293 (2017) (en banc).
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knowledge. Curbing legislative processes impedes the people’s elected representatives from determining and serving the public interest. Gun privacy claims conceal government information from the public. Blaming gun violence on popular
culture exposes mass media to government censorship.
Communal free speech values in speech-arms collisions reflect rich and potent communal elements in broader First Amendment theory. The familiar “marketplace of ideas” metaphor extols the collective apprehension of truth and treats
expressive freedom as the best structure for determining truth.143 Democracycentered theories of the First Amendment posit expressive freedom as providing
the political community with the information necessary for collective self-government.144 Thomas Emerson’s safety valve theory views expressive freedom as protecting society from violent action by letting dissenters blow off steam.145 Vincent
Blasi’s “checking value” holds that the First Amendment serves the political
community by curbing government abuses.146 First Amendment provisions beyond the Free Speech Clause focus on communal interests. The Press Clause protects the capacity of the news media to inform the public about the workings of
government and other matters of public concern.147 The freedom of expressive
association protects the right of groups and communities to express and share
ideas.148 Communication does not happen in a vacuum of individual autonomy.
Rather, it requires constructive interactions between and among speakers and
audiences.
While communal interests matter deeply in First Amendment theory, they
can be difficult or impossible to vindicate in First Amendment litigation, as illustrated by the Fifth Circuit’s denial on standing grounds of campus carry’s chilling
effect in Glass v. Paxton.149 That difficulty leaves the impression of a false equivalence between the competing interests in speech-arms collisions. If only individual autonomy mattered, then resolving these collisions would come down to a
choice about which sort of autonomy—the freedom to speak or the right to keep
and bear arms—mattered more.Once we see that the speech side of speech-arms
collisions also embodies a communal interest in public communication, and that
the arms side presents no communal interest of any substance, then resolving
those collisions presents a choice between a broader and a narrower set of interests.

143. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Homes, J., dissenting).
144. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 112.
145. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
884–86 (1963).
146. See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977).
147. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY (2002).
148. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 1220 YALE L.J. 879 (2011).
149. 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018).
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B. Stability vs. Dynamism
My examination of current problems in First Amendment doctrine has emphasized the doctrine’s importance for mediating between stability and dynamism in politics and society.150 I have criticized the present Supreme Court under
Chief Justice John Roberts for accelerating a turn in First Amendment doctrine
away from enabling dynamism and toward preserving stability. I have advocated,
in opposition to the Roberts Court, a First Amendment model of dynamic diversity, which seeks to maximize the range of both participants and ideas in public
discourse. Dynamic diversity opens space for dissident speakers to advocate, and
for the public to assess, novel and bold ideas for political and social change. The
opposition between stability and dynamism within First Amendment law and theory recurs in speech-arms collisions. The gun rights arguments in those collisions
assert the importance of guns for protecting social and political stability. In contrast, the free speech arguments appeal to the potential for dynamic discussion
and debate.
Gun rights arguments in speech-arms collisions emphasize the importance of
guns for preservation and protection. Public carry advocates see threats in the
political intensity of public protests and in the intellectual foment of universities.
They argue that carrying weapons protects them from those threats while also
enabling them to protect others from violent disruptions. Their desire to carry
guns outside the home suggests a desire to carry the home itself, to be as safe at
a protest or a college lecture as in one’s private preserve. Gun privacy arguments
reflect the anxiety that public knowledge of gun owners’ identities will expose
them to harassment and even violence. Gun rights arguments in other speecharms collisions appeal even more directly to stability. Cutting off funding for research into gun violence ensures that no advance in knowledge will disrupt the
gun rights status quo. Preventing legislation and litigation about gun violence
forecloses change in gun laws and policies. Barring physicians from talking to
their patients about guns cuts off the risk that health information might cause gun
owners themselves to change their lifestyles. Blaming popular culture for gun violence kills two destabilizing birds with one bullet, blocking changes in gun policies while attacking cultural materials that stimulate youthful rebellion against
adult authority.
The broader gun rights movement and gun culture likewise fixate on safety,
security, and stability. Fear of change creates the imperative for armed self-defense. The shift in Heller from an anti-tyranny theory of the Second Amendment
to a personal self-defense theory embodies a lurch from dynamism to stability.
At a certain level of abstraction, the Second Amendment’s allowance for an
armed populace to rise up as one and overthrow a tyrannical government promotes stability by preserving a non-tyrannical status quo. In more immediate
terms, though, nothing could strike closer to the core of social stability than an
armed insurrection against the government. Whatever else armed rebellion does,
150. See generally MAGARIAN, supra note 120.
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it surely brings dynamic change. In contrast, personal self-defense embodies a
fear of change. The world of gun rights partisans is a dark, violent place. Their
homes, families, and property provide shelter from outside dangers. Potential
change means the threat that bad people will hurt or kill them and their families
and steal their property. The government cannot or will not protect them.151 Only
their guns keep them safe.
In sharp contrast, arguments for choosing free speech over gun rights emphasize what speech can achieve and transform. True, the argument that public carry
chills speech appeals to safety. Yet opponents of public carry in protests and universities demand safety not to stand still but rather to forge ahead. The counterprotesters who stood up to armed white supremacists in Charlottesville sought to
tear down the monuments of an old order. The students, faculty, and others who
decry campus carry want to debate bold ideas and fresh insights. Gun control
advocates use scientific research, the legislative process, the courts, and the public
square to pursue a radical shift in the laws and culture of a society saturated with
firearms. Efforts to inform the public through all those arenas, through government disclosures, and even through physicians’ unconstrained medical advice
serve the interest in conceiving and implementing new polices and behaviors.
Blaming gun violence on gun proliferation and not on media imagery maintains
a focus on policy change while vindicating an energetic cultural landscape. Where
the arguments for gun rights in speech-arms collisions cling to the stable world
we know, the arguments for free speech aspire to the dynamic world we can imagine.
Gun rights partisans have no story to tell about how gun proliferation moves
our society forward. Free speech advocates have the path of dynamism, creativity, and progress all to themselves. For many people in this fraught socio-political
moment, pursuing dynamism is a hard sell. The anxieties of our age, including
anxiety about gun violence, have helped to submerge dynamism as a theme in
present free speech discourse. However, dynamic arguments for choosing free
speech over gun rights spring from the defining insights of our First Amendment
tradition. Justice Brandeis, chiding a state’s fervor to suppress its political opponents, declared: “Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of
liberty.”152 Justice Jackson, subordinating patriotic fervor to freedom of conscience in the heat of wartime, proclaimed: “[F]reedom to differ is not limited to
things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order.”153 These foundational principles contrast the dynamic hope of
free speech with the fearful stability of gun rights.

151. See Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 713, 728–32 (2011) (situating the Second Amendment right of self-defense in a sense of anxiety
about the government’s failure to protect the people from violence).
152. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
153. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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IV
CONCLUSION
Gun rights threaten free speech. A gun rights partisan might just as easily flip
the script and argue that free speech threatens gun rights. To my knowledge,
however, no gun rights advocate has ever made that argument out loud. Doing
so would undercut gun rights advocates’ common portrayal of the Second
Amendment as harmonious with the First Amendment. It would set the novel,
contentious Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms against the established, cherished First Amendment right of expressive freedom. Thus, even if one
rejects this Article’s normative priority for free speech over gun rights, consideration of speech-arms collisions greatly complicates the argument for gun rights.
On the other hand, anyone who shares this Article’s normative inclination should
recognize the danger that speech-arms collisions pose to expressive freedom.
Collisions between First and Second Amendment interests reveal an intractable
opposition. That opposition will only grow as the Supreme Court expands Second
Amendment jurisprudence. Our legal future thus presents a stark choice between
robust communication and gun proliferation.

